Guarding the Blue Frontier: Tackling Non-Traditional Threats in the Maritime Domain

Michael van Ginkel is a doctoral researcher at Tilburg Law School in the Netherlands. Before accepting a position at Tilburg, he developed his expertise in Black Sea security while conducting research for universities, government agencies, and think tanks both in Europe and the United States. He developed his specialization in maritime security under the Stable Seas Program in the United States, where he advised government agencies and international organizations on maritime security, including the United Nations office of Drugs and Crime and the International Organization of Migration. His current research focuses on the nexus between illicit activity and protracted conflicts in the maritime domain.

This interview has been authorised for publication by Michael van Ginkel.

SPCIS: How do you assess the evolving role of non-traditional threats in shaping global security policies today?

Michael van Ginkel: Similar to other domains, the maritime domain has seen a perceptible shift in how non-traditional threats materialize in tandem with the development of new technologies. While law enforcement agencies have made use of recent advancements in technologies like artificial intelligence to improve maritime domain awareness and intercept threats, non-state actors are not far behind. From the deployment of sea drones as attack craft to the use of software defined radios to spoof vessel locations, non-state actors have shown a similar propensity towards embracing the use of new technologies to achieve their objectives. The need to contend with the threat posed by rapidly developing technologies in the wrong hands has galvanized many nations to implement maritime policies to explicitly address vulnerabilities in cyberspace.

Globalization has also affected the maritime domain. Non-traditional threats that capitalize on increased connectivity, including maritime trafficking of commodities and humans, constantly pose new challenges to law enforcement agencies across the globe. Difficulties in monitoring the vast expanses of open oceans, extensive coastlines and archipelagos, and overlapping maritime jurisdictions have only increased in response to upticks in maritime traffic. The challenges in regulating movement along sea lanes of communications and through ports means that global security policies have to emphasize international cooperation and efficient resource allocation when addressing non-traditional threats in the maritime domain.

The challenges posed by the evolving role of non-traditional threats in the maritime domain have already significantly shaped global security policies, especially when considered in conjunction with developments in hybrid-warfare. Weaponizing non-traditional security threats can allow governments to undermine the security and sovereignty of neighboring nations while oftentimes maintaining a ruse of plausible deniability. To contend with the evolving range of challenges, security policies now must take whole-of-society approaches to building resilience. Ultimately, understanding how non-traditional and traditional threats interact to affect national and international security architectures create opportunities to develop sustainable counter measures.

SPCIS:  What role do international organizations and frameworks play in fostering peaceful solutions to maritime disputes in sensitive regions?

Michael van Ginkel: Agreeing to abide by the resolutions of international organizations and frameworks reinforces mutual understandings of how national and international maritime challenges should be addressed. Although the context of individual maritime disputes need to be taken into consideration, these international organizations and frameworks create an opportunity to standardize how disputes are resolved in a peaceful manner. Similarly, the guidelines for maritime conduct they set forward can decrease the risk of accidental escalations by ensuring all parties are aware of what constitutes normal conduct.

International organizations and frameworks also provide important platforms for collaboration and discourse. The opportunity for sustained interactions between both governments at large and specific maritime related agencies can help build trust between the relevant parties, which is critical to generating mutually acceptable solutions to sensitive maritime disputes. These interactions can provide a means to increase both official and unofficial communications. Backchannels play an especially important role in navigating sensitive subjects by allowing officials to find common ground without officially compromising on policy.

Within the context of the Black Sea, the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have already both proven useful mechanisms to resolving maritime disputes in the past. In 2009, for instance, Ukraine and Romania, in accordance with UNCLOS, agreed to abide by the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Hague to peacefully settle a longstanding dispute on maritime delineations around Ukraine’s snake island. By working within UNCLOS’ framework, the parties were able to reach an acceptable solution without harming bilateral relations.

SPCIS: Could you share your perspective on balancing national security interests with collaborative security mechanisms in the maritime domain?

Michael van Ginkel: The interconnected nature of the maritime domain can often mean the advantages offered by collaborations outweigh the detriments. Within the field of non-traditional security especially, joint efforts are frequently needed to develop sustainable solutions to maritime challenges. Non-state actors involved in piracy and armed robbery, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and even coastal insurgencies elude law-enforcement and military operations by fleeing across maritime jurisdictions when faced with government pressure. In cases like these, setting aside political differences can greatly improve not only the coastal welfare and economic prosperity of the nations involved, but also enhance physical security.

Where the national security interests of one coastal country are diametrically opposed to those of neighboring countries, striking a balance becomes a more nuanced affair. Continuing to cooperate where possible in non-traditional security challenges that are not politically charged, like environmental degradation, can on occasion remain a viable option. Keeping existing collaborative frameworks on specific non-traditional security issues in place until tensions recede can create opportunities for more sustained cooperation in the future as well as mitigate some of the long-term side-effects sudden dissociation could impart on local communities.

In the case of the Black Sea, Russia’s military incursions have considerably undermined the effectiveness of multilateral platforms like the Black Sea Economic Forum that have striven to provide a united front against region-wide threats like organized crime and illegal fishing. Smaller working groups, however, continue to collaborate on specific thematic issues like trade and education where possible. While national security interests can overshadow collaborative security mechanisms in the maritime domain, understanding when and where collaboration can continue on non-traditional threats can both improve overall human security and potentially facilitate reconciliation.