In the insightful interview with Dr. Essam Abdelshafy, a distinguished Professor of Political Science at Sakarya University, Turkey, and a prominent figure at the Egyptian Institute for Studies (EIS) and the International Relations Academy (IRA), the complex dynamics of civil-military relations and their impact on Egypt's political landscape are thoroughly examined. Dr. Abdelshafy's expertise sheds light on the historical evolution of the military institution in Egypt since 1952, the interplay between authoritarianism and democracy, and the challenges and opportunities for political transformations in the country. Through a nuanced analysis, this interview script provides valuable insights into the factors shaping Egypt's path towards democracy, the role of the military in economic policies, and the implications for social and economic inequality. Let us delve deeper into the key themes and considerations highlighted by Dr. Abdelshafy in this engaging discussion.
Impact of consolidation of Egyptian army’s authoritarianism and despotism on the country’s democratic aspirations and civil liberties
To start with, there are several factors and considerations that govern the role played by the military institution in Egypt, particularly those emanating from the Egyptian interior, whether from within the military institution itself, or from within the Egyptian political system and its associated actors and interactions.
These factors include:
1- The historical factor, which means the development of the role played by the military institution since 1952, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the monarchy and the installation of Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of the country via popular referendum in 1956. The armed forces were at that time portrayed as agents of social change, leading the “revolution from above”. In the 1950s, the military institution oversaw redistribution of the land and the so-called “Egyptianizing” of the industrial and financial sectors; and starting from late 1961, it oversaw socialist policies. With the beginnings of Mubarak’s rule in the 1980s, senior army officers were drawn into a presidential system based on influence and favoritism and co-opting the armed forces and stripping them of their political character and role, as the “officers’ republic” has penetrated civil life so much that its existence has become a normal and natural matter, not only in the eyes of others but also in the eyes of its personnel themselves, which this is more important.
After 1991, the process of integration into Mubarak's favoritism system took place through a promise of allocation of a "loyalty allowance" to be received by senior officers upon retirement, in return for refraining from engagement in politics and accepting relatively low salaries during their years of service in the armed forces. Military retirees who enjoy close relationships with influential parties can be appointed to jobs in the civil government apparatus, providing them with opportunities to secure additional income or double their material assets, in addition to their salaries and pensions. Sometimes, the second appointment takes place simultaneously with their active service period in the armed forces, to build valuable resumes and build relationships in preparation for obtaining better positions after retirement. These officers often assume senior leadership positions in the concerned branches of the armed forces to which they belong, and then join the boards of directors of state-owned commercial companies after their retirement from the army.
2- The military institution structure, which is based on concentration of the institution’s management in the hands of a group of leaders who run the situation within the military institution, including the President -being the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces-, the Minister of Defense, and leaders of the main branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces (Chief of Staff, Air Forces Commander, Air Defense Commander, of Naval Forces Commander, and Head of Military Operations Authority). The Egyptian National Defense Council was also established to be in charge of setting general frameworks for securing the homeland, as well as defining the basic doctrine, environmental doctrine, and organizational doctrine for the Egyptian army.
In 1968, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was formed by late President Gamal Abdel Nasser under Law No. 4 of 1968, after the 1967 military defeat, with a formal goal of coordination of the strategy and operations of the armed forces in times of war, for which reason late President Anwar Sadat sought to obtain its advice before the 1973 war.
After the January 2011 revolution, the Council made an exceptional decision, stipulating that SCAF members will not cease to have military status even if they were removed from service for any reason or after retirement, provided that they would remain subject to summons to SCAF. Therefore, any military commander who becomes a SCAF member simultaneously becomes summoned to the Council even if he quits service. Also, no leader can make a unilateral decision except after referring to SCAF and obtaining the approval of its current and summoned members, such as the desire to run for presidential or parliamentary elections, and the like.
3- The military institution’s foreign relations, as the military’s foreign relations have fluctuated between the former Soviet Union and the United States since 1952. However, the United States and Israel have been the two largest powers that enjoy influence on the Egyptian military institution since 2013, where depth and closeness of such relationship appears in the joint military operations carried out by the Egyptian army in participation with the Israeli army in the Sinai Peninsula, as well as the joint military exercises that are held on annual basis between them, which has been reflected in the two parties’ interactions in the country’s political and democratic transformations and elimination of the desired transformation experience (to democracy) after the January 2011 revolution.
The affects of the Egyptian army’s economic policies and practices on the country’s development and social and economic inequality
The economic activity of the Egyptian army significantly expanded after General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took office, where the army benefited from replacing the public tender system with a direct order sales system within state institutions. The army's activity extended to some new activities, given the fact that Sisi issued a decree allowing the armed forces to found and establish companies on their own, or in partnership with national or foreign capital. The army’s expansion into the Egyptian economy appears in its intervention for resolving urgent crises in the Egyptian market, due to the decline in private sector investments thanks to the economic policies and the decline in the local currency’s exchange rate. This accordingly resulted in a tense relationship between the armed forces and some private sector segments, given the restrictions on the activities of businessmen in general and confiscation of the funds of some of them. Then, Sisi issued a decision allowing representation of the armed forces in the committee charged with inventorying the properties of the Endowments Authority and determining the means of benefiting from them; as well as representation of the Ministry of Defense in the National Investment Council, chaired by the President of the State – where the privileges enjoyed by the military institution became so numerous.
Then came the amendments to the 2014 Constitution, which were approved by the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives (the Parliament’s lower chamber) on 14 April 2019 and were approved by MPs during the Parliament’s plenary sessions on 16 April 2019. A referendum on the amendments was held on 19, 20, and 21 April 2019 for Egyptians expatriates, and on 20, 21, and 22 April for citizens within the country, where the result was announced on 23 April 2019, with the approval of 88.8% of the electorate participating in the referendum. The amendments included consolidation of the role of the military institution as a supra-constitutional institution, assigned with preservation of the constitution and democracy, as well as preservation of the basic components of the state and its civility.
In addition, there were also multiple decisions for allocation of state lands and companies to the armed forces. For instance, in June 2016, Sisi issued a presidential decree excluding the economic zone in the Sinai Peninsula from provisions of Law No. 14 of 2012, and was allocated to the armed forces to implement projects therein. The Official Gazette also published Presidential Decree/Law No. 233 of 2016 on allocation of desert lands to the Ministry of Defense, viewing them as military strategic areas, and assigning the Armed Forces to be the body responsible for monitoring the lands located 2 km from both sides of the national road network and removing all encroachments on them, except for those certified by the relevant state agencies, to enable the competent state agencies to establish development projects thereon. Also, large areas of state-owned land were reallocated as private property for the benefit of the armed forces. In fact, the real problem was not in the allocation decisions themselves, but in granting them the right to dispose of these lands through buying, selling, donating, granting, and waiving, which results in external arrangements for the benefit of foreign parties, especially in the strategically important Sinai Peninsula.
Repercussions of the Egyptian army’s direct control over state institutions on political stability and effectiveness of governance in the long term
Given the fact that the army is Egypt’s de facto ruler, with complete control and hegemony over the country, the paths of change in the long-term, could be through:
First, success and effectiveness of the popular protest movement, that is, the military institution vis-à-vis widespread popular protests that succeeded in achieving its goals; therefore, there will be no other choice for the military institution but to surrender to popular pressures and quit power with no other alternative options.
Taking into mind that the result of this path is the exit of the military without any guarantees and even without negotiation, with accountability for the committed political and humanitarian crimes, the Egyptian army will therefore stand in the face of any popular protests against it, and will use all possible means to suppress these protests and ensure that they do not threaten its interests and existence.
Second, withdrawal of the military from power when circumstances and the balance of power change, forcing the military institution to change its position in power, taking other forms. Although it may be forced to directly withdraw from power, it may remain in control of politics and the political path in one way or another, where such withdrawal from power may take place either through the military institution itself or through a negotiation process with civilians, in a way that ensures retaining of part of its interests and influence, noting that this path takes longer time; and its challenges are more complicated.
However, this path requires the presence of a set of factors, including:
1) The military’s awareness of the difficulty of remaining in power, and the military institution itself starts exiting from power after the social and political context has become unfavorable for the military rule, where this could be supported by the emergence of a reformist wing within the military institution that supports the exit of the military from power.
2) Concluding a national accord for transition within an extended reform process in which reformists from within the military institution and civilians reach a consensus on a political path and reform steps.
3) Success (or failure) in the economy performance, as economic failure may contribute to escalation of popular anger, which could increase pressure on the military institution to quit power. Likewise, economic success may lead to pressure on the military institution through the emergence of a broad middle class and popular demands for political participation.
4) Neutralizing or winning the external factor related to this issue, given that the regional and international support for the political transition or its non-objection constitutes a decisive factor in the democratic transition processes.
This path also has a set of pre requirements, including:
- That civilians gain control over the state’s public policies, with the need to change or force to change the military institution’s existing culture of distrust of civilians, based on the surrounding circumstances.
- That civilians have appropriate policies and ideas that could contribute to solving existing problems in more effective ways than those used by the army, provided that these policies succeed to achieve tangible results to help gain the confidence of citizens and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the military institution.
- That civilians have the ability to seize the opportunity to consolidate their influence within the political sphere and weaken the influence of the military institution therein, especially in light of the (dire) situation in Egypt 11 years after the 2013 coup d’etat and the security, military and political challenges, and the resulting negative repercussions on the mental image of the military institution, on the one hand, and the degree of political and economic stability in Egypt, on the other.
In this regard, it is to be noted that the civilian movements are keen to keep the military institution stable and strong – something that should be benefited from, provided that the functional role of the military institution within the state be reshaped, amid the collapses that most Arab military institutions have been exposed to since 1991.
It appears quite certain that the current regional and international transformations are mostly outside the control of the civilian and military elites, and accordingly require them to tackle them effectively; otherwise, the movement of the angry masses and the successive waves of uprisings will be a radical change factor, affecting the survival and continuation of many entities, institutions, and even states in the region, where Egypt is not far from such threat.
Conclusion
Dr. Essam Abdelshafy's comprehensive interview script delves into the intricate web of civil-military relations in Egypt, offering a profound analysis of the historical context, current challenges, and future prospects for political transformations in the country. From the military's role in social change since 1952 to the consolidation of authoritarianism and its impact on democratic aspirations, Dr. Abdelshafy navigates through the complexities of Egypt's political landscape with scholarly precision.
The interview script also sheds light on the Egyptian army's economic policies and practices, exploring their implications for development and social-economic inequality. By examining the military's expanding economic activities under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's leadership and its interventions in resolving market crises, Dr. Abdelshafy highlights the tensions between the armed forces and the private sector, underscoring the need for a balanced economic framework that fosters growth and equity.
Moreover, the script delves into the repercussions of the Egyptian army's direct control over state institutions on political stability and governance effectiveness in the long term. By analyzing potential paths for change, including the interplay between popular protests and military responses, Dr. Abdelshafy paints a nuanced picture of the challenges and opportunities facing Egypt's political evolution.
In conclusion, Dr. Essam Abdelshafy's interview script serves as a valuable resource for understanding the multifaceted dynamics of civil-military relations in Egypt and the implications for the country's democratic aspirations, economic development, and social fabric. His insightful analysis calls for a nuanced approach to navigating the complexities of Egypt's political landscape, emphasizing the importance of inclusive governance, economic reform, and strategic engagement with regional and international partners to steer the country towards a more stable and prosperous future.
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