International Criminal Law in Transition: Ethics, Sovereignty, and Human Dignity

Dr. Rustam Atadjanov, LLB, LLM, Dr. iur., PhD, is Associate Professor and Associate Dean at KIMEP University School of Law, Almaty, Kazakhstan. He is an editor and co-editor in several academic books and periodicals including the Journal of International Peacekeeping, Ukrainian Law Review, and the Journal of Humanity, Peace and Justice. His areas of expertise and research include public international law, international human rights law, international criminal law, international humanitarian law, diplomatic and consular law, law of treaties, theory of law and state, constitutional law, criminal law, and more.

Dr. Atadjanov wrote around 70 academic and publicist articles, monograph chapters, scholarly papers, encyclopaedic contributions and book reviews in a number of European and Asian academic journals. Furthermore, he is a co-editor of a major two-volume book titled “International Conflict and Security Law. A Research Handbook” published by T.M.C. Asser Press and Springer in 2022. Professor Atadjanov’s new textbook on common theory of law for the post-Soviet states is expected to be published in 2025, while the second edition of his major monograph of 2019 called “Humanness as a Protected Legal Interest of Crimes against Humanity. Conceptual and Normative Aspects” will be published in 2026. At the KIMEP University School of Law, he teaches Public Law and International Law-related courses.

This interview has been authorised for publication by Dr. Rustam Atadjanov.

SPCIS: How has the interpretation of the concept of humanity evolved within international criminal law over the past decades?

Dr. Rustam Atadjanov: From what I have long observed, the concept of humanity in international criminal law (ICL) has undergone a gradual but significant transformation, from an evocative phrase in the Nuremberg Charter to a core conceptual construct in modern doctrine. Initially, the term "humanity" lacked any precise legal and holistic meaning and functioned more as a rhetorical device to condemn morally repugnant acts. Over time, particularly through the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, but also the work of the ILC, the term began to acquire structural relevance. However, the notion remains conceptually vague and normatively unenforced. My argument, developed across several of my works, is that this ambiguity undermines the principle of legal certainty and interpretive coherence. I have therefore proposed that “humanity” be understood as “humanness,” or the essential human status shared by all individuals.

This interpretation provides both a principled foundation and a definable protected interest (or Rechtsgut) in crimes against humanity. Viewed this way, such crimes attack not merely individual rights or social order or a collective aggregate of all people but the very condition of being human, eroding dignity, reason, freedom, and humaneness itself. This reconceptualization marks a shift from doctrinal patchwork toward a more holistic and value-based understanding, which is indispensable for a meaningful future of ICL.

SPCIS:  What legal and ethical considerations are most important when defining crimes against humanity in diverse global contexts?

Dr. Rustam Atadjanov: The legal definition of crimes against humanity must balance two imperatives: normative universality and contextual sensitivity. Legally speaking, it is essential to articulate the protected interest with precision. Crimes against humanity cannot remain entrenched in abstract moral outrage; their definition must reflect a coherent normative basis. I argue that this basis is the human status, i.e., “humanness”, that transcends specific identities or state borders. Ethically, the definition must be robust enough to protect against the gravest harms while accommodating the diverse ways in which dignity, freedom, and community are conceptualized across cultures.

However, cultural relativism cannot become an excuse for non-enforcement. Mass atrocities such as widespread persecution, enforced disappearances, or systematic violence against civilians represent violations of fundamental human conditions - conditions which are universally recognized, even if their manifestations vary.

The danger lies in allowing political or cultural exceptionalism to obscure the core harm: the dehumanization of individuals or human groups. Thus, the key consideration is to define these crimes in a way that protects the humanness shared by all, while allowing room for legitimate cultural variation in the interpretation of rights, but never in the denial of their essence.

 

SPCIS: In your opinion, how effective are current international legal instruments in addressing large-scale human rights violations?

Dr. Rustam Atadjanov: While international legal instruments such as the Rome Statute represent important achievements, their effectiveness in practice remains uneven. True, the normative framework exists, but its implementation is often selective, politicized, or procedurally delayed. One core weakness lies in the failure to adequately define what is being protected, or what we call "protective scope of crimes".

Crimes against humanity are said to attack “humanity,” yet this term is absent from positive law definitions and lacks conceptual clarity. Without a clearly articulated legal interest, such as, e.g., the “humanness” I have proposed, international enforcement efforts risk inconsistency and reduced legitimacy. Moreover, institutional limitations, from jurisdictional constraints to enforcement gaps, further diminish the impact of legal instruments. That said, international legal tools are not irrelevant; quite to the contrary, they serve an important expressive function and can enable accountability when coupled with political will and civil society engagement. This is what I call a realistic attitude.

But effectiveness must be measured not only by convictions or legal precision, but also by whether the international system affirms the equal value of all human lives. In that sense, the value-based approaches in law are very important. Until this principle is universally upheld in both doctrine and practice, international instruments will, I'm afraid, continue to fall short of their potential.

SPCIS: How can international criminal law balance accountability with respect for state sovereignty and cultural diversity?

Dr. Rustam Atadjanov: This is not an easy question, and there is no one unique and all-encompassing "panacea" approach, or answer to everything, so to speak. But I believe that such a balance can only be achieved by anchoring ICL in values that are both universal and fundamentally human. Sovereignty should never shield the commission of atrocities (as I will discuss in more detail in an upcoming new publication); yet legal universalism must certainly not devolve into cultural imposition. The way forward lies in framing crimes against humanity as violations of humanness itself, that is, human dignity, merci, and reason shared across all cultures.

If this is the protected interest, then prosecuting such crimes is not about imposing foreign or alien norms but about defending a basic threshold of human decency which connects us all. Respect for cultural diversity must inform the interpretation of legal norms, but not their existence. This approach aligns with the German Rechtsgut doctrine I mentioned earlier: laws should protect legitimate and necessary interests of society. Crimes against humanity threaten the most essential of these, i.e, the peaceful coexistence of individuals in their human condition.

Therefore, states retain cultural and legal sovereignty within limits set by shared humanity. Criminal or state accountability does not deny sovereignty; it affirms it by recognizing that no legitimate state can (or should) allow mass dehumanization within its borders.