Lucas Gualda: Strategic tensions and a new phase in China-Argentina relations

As part of its Latin American section, Saint Pierre—a platform dedicated to geopolitical and economic analysis from a global perspective—presents an interview by Joaquin Sáez, researcher of SPCIS. Within this framework, we spoke with Lucas Gualda,  a sinologist who participated in the 2018 Young Program for Young Sinologists organized by China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism. He is a Mandarin Chinese teacher and a researcher at CeChino, Institute of International Relations, National University of La Plata (UNLP). He is currently studying at Beijing Language and Culture University and frequently writes for DangDai about Chinese technologies.

Lucas Gualda, a sinologist who participated in the 2018 Young Program for Young Sinologists organized by China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism. He is a Mandarin Chinese teacher and a researcher at CeChino, Institute of International Relations, National University of La Plata (UNLP). He is currently studying a Master at Beijing Language and Culture University and frequently writes for DangDai, Xinhua and CGTN about Chinese technologies, politics and economy.

Joaquín: What motivated China to restrict rare earth exports now?

Lucas: China’s position in the world is at its strongest. From a realist perspective, this can be explained as follows: the country is opening the yuan to international trade, an Australian mining company will accept yuan for steel imports, Arab countries are trading in yuan with China… it is clear that the international system is recognizing China’s weight and importance. The problem lies in still having the U.S. in the middle of all this.

If we talk about “weaponizing,” the U.S. has been doing it for decades with SWIFT, imposing blockades on countries whose political systems do not align with liberal values. The difference is that China is too large and too embedded in the global economy to attempt such blockades. At the same time, Beijing has been working for years on a decoupling strategy that would allow the country to survive if such a scenario occurred.

The comparison is Russia, which has become completely isolated, suffering active-age male casualties (soldiers) and a brain drain of young talent—a combination that drives decline.

We cannot forget that this year China took steps toward developing a sovereign AI, a strategy coordinated between the state and private sector. Deepseek’s announcement triggered a patriotic wave of support, integrating AI into services, university curricula, and student ambitions—a nation united in pursuit of AGI (artificial general intelligence) while strengthening society toward the 2049 goal (a moderately wealthy country).

Joaquín: What is the U.S. seeking with its agreement with Argentina on critical minerals? Is there a counterbalance to the lithium triangle?

Lucas: The goal is to address a situation long overlooked: an assertive China saying no to repeated pressures. This is not new; it’s been China’s reality since the Opium Wars. We are in a loop, though now the “opioid prisoners” are on the other side.

Ironically, the modern world depends on resources extracted by China, and no one noticed this massive dependency for decades. This is a victory for interdependence theorists: the world lives in peace as long as resources driving progress are not weaponized.

Years ago, together with researcher Juan Patterson, we warned that China held leverage over rare earths, controlling not only extraction (a difficult process with low concentration and high waste) but also refining. Li Chenggang, a negotiator promoted after his tenure at the WTO, wrote in 2011 about the strategic importance of rare earths and their potential as key bargaining tools. This scenario has ceased to be utopian and is now becoming reality under those who first foresaw it.

Is it good news for Argentina to have these minerals? Absolutely. But it will take a long time to see returns, and importantly, if development does not revitalize Argentina’s interior, it will perpetuate the extractivist system inherited from the colonial era. Development cannot occur without simultaneously strengthening the interior and reducing dependence on Greater Buenos Aires—a true black hole.

Joaquín: Is it possible for Argentina or other Latin American countries to maintain balanced relations with China and the U.S.?

Lucas: Like Chile does. Santiago experienced a double blockade, an unusual situation that made the country a hostage to itself, forcing it to find solutions in its own weakness. By moving from isolation to free trade agreements, Chile opened to the world and became one of the region’s most reliable business partners, as well as a political and financial oasis—a rare occurrence in the Global South.

Of course, Argentina’s context is different from Chile’s, starting with capital concentration. Chile’s limited number of actors allows faster decision-making, while in Argentina, any political decision is like entering a labyrinth. Decisions based on Washington’s security concerns are, at best, acts of genuflection with little benefit. Bilateral relations should be guided by genuine development opportunities and win-win cooperation, as Beijing’s discourse demonstrates, making China the most relevant actor in the Global South.

Today, exchanges between nations in China are vibrant; it has become the true center of the world. While global capitals see flows of the wealthy, China also attracts tomorrow’s leaders, students, and future entrepreneurs. When these seeds mature, the balance will tip further.

But if Argentina does not nurture these seeds, it will remain economically barren, dependent on a “good rainfall” to survive.

As Trump said recently in Japan: China has a great leader capable of instant decisions. The world is beginning to appreciate China’s achievements under its political system—a remarkable feat given the need to centralize decisions in a country of over 9 million km² and 1.45 billion people. Nothing negligible!

Joaquín: What risks does Argentina face if it leans too heavily toward one side, considering presidential transitions?

Lucas: Memorandums of understanding do not sustain livelihoods. As Perón said (the original Perón, not his later years), reality is the only truth, and in this world, reality is dictated by numbers.

Events like AmCham in Argentina get front-page coverage, especially on Infobae, closely tied to U.S. embassies. By contrast, when the Argentine-Chinese Chamber or similar organizations hold events of equal caliber, mainstream media coverage is scarce.

Currently, media balance favors the U.S. Politically, as indicated by Milei after the midterm elections, both countries are “natural allies,” though public opinion shows appreciation for Chinese people, who have integrated into Argentina often more successfully than immigrants from neighboring countries.

Doing business with China is sometimes seen as risky due to the blurred line between state and capital. However, private investments like Elon Musk’s or OpenAI’s (Sam Altman) show that government goodwill matters—does this not also reflect state influence on capital?

If Washington’s business decisions in Argentina are based on political alignment, they may fail. But if grounded in integration into global value chains, outcomes may differ. China always operates this way, and ignoring an actor who reveals its cards could be costly.

Joaquín: What concrete steps should Argentina take to better leverage its strategic resources for long-term strategy?

Lucas: First, a strong political agreement to create a system favoring large-scale investments is essential—currently addressed only through special investment laws, which have drawn criticism from smaller but willing investors. Needing a special law signals weakness and should end.

A more flexible tax system, where provinces compete to attract capital (as proposed by President Milei), would be beneficial. Labor and tax reforms are also essential to improve the business climate. Ideology aside, these measures are necessary for Argentina to attract long-term investment and move past complex economic headlines.

Ultimately, Argentina can solve many difficulties independently, a luxury few countries have. Yet, even with opportunities, it is not scoring goals.

Joaquín: How do you envision Latin America’s role in this global competition for critical resources?

Lucas: Complicated. Much of Latin America’s workforce is trapped in intellectual poverty, distracted or lacking direction. Governments influenced by progressive ideas have weakened education systems, turning schools into chaotic daycares. Teachers (mostly progressive women) often exacerbate the situation.

Quality education lies mostly in private hands, benefiting a few but leaving generations vulnerable to social media dependence, individualism, and external validation. The crisis of values is global; China faces similar challenges.

Criticism of democracy for poor leadership overlooks the fact that society allowed this situation to develop. Calls for a “government of the wise” reflect the scarcity of knowledge, a luxury for few even in hyper-informed societies.

Unlike Europe or the U.S., Latin America has little to lose. If AI replaces jobs, 50% of the population may remain unemployed. As with Chile, isolation may eventually force innovative solutions for the future.