Dr. Vithiyapathy Purushothaman is pursuing his Post-Doctorate at the School of International Studies at Shenzhen University. He is an Associate Member at the Chennai Centre for China Studies, India. His field of interest centres around Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, defence and Strategy. His book publications include “Brahmaputra: The Strategic Water Resource of India” and “India’s Strategic Guardian of the Sky: IRNSS”. His recent chapter titled “Changing Dynamics of Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Asia” has been published. He is also president of China News Analysis Daily, which periodically brings insights into his academic understanding through posts, articles, podcasts, and videos. He completed his Masters and MPhil in Defence and Strategic Studies at the University of Madras. During his doctorate at the University of Science and Technology of China, he was honoured to receive the “Chinese Government Outstanding International Student Scholarship Award”, “USTC Excellent International Student Award for Academic Excellence”, and the “Best Activity Participation Award” for his academic endeavours.
Maritime Silk Road & China-India relations
What are the main objectives of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative? What are the economic and security impacts of the MSR on the countries along the route, particularly India?
China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is one of the two pillars of the Belt and Road Initiative. It aims to improve global trade connectivity by enhancing economic and infrastructure development and trade cooperation among the countries along its route. Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed this modern extension of MSR in 2013, aiming to enhance global trade links, investments and economic growth through cooperation. Thus, MSR revived China's ancient legacy of the Maritime trade route, which facilitated trade and cultural exchanges between civilisations worldwide. China aims to promote economic growth and development by facilitating regional trade and investment. As a result, it enhances infrastructure development and fosters people-to-people connections that provide win-win cooperation for the participating countries.
Notably, the MSR creates a seamless network of maritime trade hubs with participating countries in South and Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. China is developing the infrastructure along the coastline of participating countries by improving the port infrastructure, shipping lanes, and maritime logistics to bolster trade capacity and regional connectivity. The port development strategy of China in the Indian Ocean Region has developed significant nodes of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), such as Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which act as a major port of trade for China further to connect the Special Economic Zones in the respective countries. These initiatives improve the transportation network and enhance the port's logistics and regional infrastructure to facilitate trade. At the same time, by creating alternative routes for trade and energy imports, MSR has established its absolute alternative for reducing the dependency on the Strait of Malacca.
The economic impact of the MSR on India includes trade opportunities and infrastructure development that India has made to enhance its connectivity. Even though India was not a part of BRI due to its border disputes with Pakistan in the PoK region, where the CPEC pass through the disputed territory of India and Pakistan. India views CPEC as a potential security threat due to the increasing cooperation between the two nations and is concerned that its security interests are being undermined. Thus, India raised its security concerns about China’s growing presence and joint naval exercises in the coastal regions of South and Southeast Asia. India indicates that China’s cooperation with the countries in the coastal areas of the Indian Ocean is forming the String of Pearl strategy that intensely challenges the Indian Navy’s primary security objective in the Indian Ocean Region. However, in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC), India cooperates to be part of the economic and infrastructure connectivity. As well as India became a full member of SCO in 2017 to promote regional stability and combat terrorism. Therefore, India engages with the MSR component of BRI selectively and pragmatically to balance its economic cooperation, and simultaneously, it ensures its security dilemma. Notably, in 2022, India’s trade deficit with China reached 101.28 billion USD, which reached $118.4 billion in the fiscal year 2023-24. Thus, China became India’s largest trading partner by overtaking the US.
What are the specific impacts of China’s military presence and port construction in the Indian Ocean on India’s security strategy?
India perceives China’s establishment of a port development in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a naval threat and a challenge to its maritime security. As per realist perceptions, China’s establishment of a military and commercial facilities network in the IOR is called an encirclement strategy or String of Pearls Strategy. The Doklam military Standoff in June 2017 further aggravated tensions between India and China. Until then, the phrase “No bullets were fired at the border of India and China since 1962” was proudly pronounced, but that has gone vein after the incident. Even though both the defence forces avoided significant escalation by using the weapons, the handheld weapons harmed each other soldiers, causing casualties.
Meanwhile, in August 2017, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began operating with its first overseas military base in Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa. Ironically, the construction of the Djibouti base started in March 2016, and China conducted its first live-fire exercise on September 22, 2017. India expressed concern regarding China’s increasing military presence related to its other port construction in IOR. Adding to that, the Galwan Skirmishes that took place between 2020 and 2022 became a scar for India-China relations along the Line of Actual Control. The escalation of the conflict between the two nations led to the casualties without firing a single bullet. Thus, it profoundly impacted the bilateral relations of both countries and primarily affected its trade relations.
Due to the standoff, India took security measures in June 2020 by quoting national security as a primary concern to limit the usage of China’s mobile applications in its territory by banning around 400 Chinese apps between 2021 and 2023. It includes famous applications like WeChat and Alipay, as well as other apps such as photo editors, web browser apps, and gaming apps. Chinese multinational companies such as Xiaomi have faced the heat of border issues that have disrupted the trade and cooperation between India and China. Presently, India perceives China’s collaboration in MSR as a significant threat to its primary objective, the Indian Navy. China’s successful completion of the overseas military base at Djibouti and China’s attempt to dock China’s research vessels in Sri Lanka have increased claims of China’s presence as a threat to India’s naval supremacy in IOR. India opposed the Hambanthota port construction and docking of China's research vessels in Sri Lanka. India expressed its concern that Gwadar and Hambanthota port, financed by China, might become a Naval base for the Chinese in future, posing a security threat to India. India further claims that China might seek replenishment facilities in Chittagong in Bangladesh, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar in Pakistan. These developments have had a notable impact on India’s development of naval capabilities to counterbalance.
Notable responses to China’s increased engagement with the Maldives in India’s backyard could be seen through how India actively responds to its upgrades to balance the perceptions of security threats. When the Maldives gained Mohamed Muizzu as President in 2023, it sided with the Chinese government by conducting a political campaign against India. It also made Indian troops withdraw from cooperative presence in Maldives. Ministers of the Muizzu government mocked PM Narendra Modi’s visit to Lakshadweep and promoted tourism on the island. India instantly proposed a strategic naval base named INS Jatayu on Minicoy, situated in the southernmost Lakshadweep archipelago, to counter traditional and nontraditional maritime threats. It is also a countermeasure for China's growing influence in the Maldives and reducing the Maritime security risk. Notably, India already has its naval base, INS Dweeprakshak, on Kavaratti, yet as a proactive measure due to raising concerns, India began its new Naval Base to enhance air mobility and amphibious operations to balance the evolving security threat in the region. Ironically, the nine-degree channel between Lakshadweep and Maldives separated them. This channel is a crucial oil and container cargo route that passes through the Indian Ocean. Thus, INS Jatayu is similar to INS Baaz, situated at Andaman and Nicobar. It monitors the crucial six-degree channel, a gateway to Malacca Strait from which Chinese vessels enter the IOR.
At the same time, India also proactively demonstrates its commitment to expanding its integration and capabilities to strengthen its strategic allies in the maritime domain. India is allying with the coastal states of IOR and focusing on island nations such as Seychelles and Mauritius to build its regional engagement to counterbalance China’s presence in the IOR. Moreover, the multi-faceted response of India strengthening its partnerships by actively engaging in QUAD to counterbalance China’s influence on IOR. Through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to promote economic and security cooperation, India began deepening its maritime partnerships with Western Pacific countries such as Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Australia. Notably, Mongolia, being a landlocked country, has improved its bilateral partnership with India to establish its relation as a third neighbor next to its bordering Russia and China.
How do India's "Neighborhood First" and "Act East" policies impact its relationship with China?
On October 10th and 11th, 2024, Modi’s Visit to Laos marked the 10th anniversary of India’s Act East Policy (AEP). The Modi government enriched the “Look East Policy,” which was initiated in 1992, by redefining it as the “Act East Policy” in 2014. India also focused on enhancing relations with its immediate neighbours through its “Neighborhood First policy” (NFP) to manage relations with its land and maritime bordering nations, with a motto similar to AEP. It’s a proactive and comprehensive approach to integrate a more strategic security approach to enhance connectivity through infrastructure, economic development, maritime cooperation and deepening its ties with ASEAN Countries. Through Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), the Indian government is attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in its Special Economic Zones (SEZ) by removing trade barriers and promoting investment to facilitate economic integration and regional connectivity. Over the decade, India has become the seventh-largest trading partner of ASEAN. At the same time, India is improving its Sagarmala project to develop its ports and enhance its sea-trade connectivity to attain port-led development and boost its SEZ investments.
On the other hand, notable connectivity projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport (KMMTT), which has waterway and roadway components inaugurated on 9 May 2023, have been seen as boosting connectivity. Trade between ASEAN countries and India reached 122 billion US dollars in 2023. Thus, ASEAN became India’s fourth-largest trading Partner. However, the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) will be reviewed by 2025 to boost bilateral trade and beneficiaries for both ends.
South and Southeast Asian countries have become significant junctures for India and China’s economic connectivity. They have become doorsteps for both nations. Especially, China’s economic engagement in Southeast Asia through the BRI and MSR meets the region along the same lines as India’s AEP and NFP. China’s economic corridor connectivity enhances the BRI, where road and railway connectivity enables the transportation and flow of goods. The vital economic corridors are the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, that connect the region; Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) and notable Railways connectivity such as Pan-Asia Railway Connectivity, which presently connects Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, and Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail connecting two cities in Indonesia.
Thus, as per constructivist views, since the roads of China and India meet the same destinations in South and Southeast Asia, it is required for both nations to strengthen their cooperation in developing the region instead of looking at confrontation ideologies. Yet, as per the realist view, China’s economic engagement challenges India’s capacity to invest in the area, and it applies the same to India’s investment capacity in the realm of China’s efforts in connectivity. India’s Neighborhood First policy was focused on promoting cooperation with the neighbouring country. However, Nepal's 2015 blockade has scarred the policy, which created an opportunity for China to expand its partnership with Nepal under the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, there is a significant impact on each other's foreign policy regarding economic activities. Apart from Border issues, when it comes to the bilateral cooperation between BRI and AEP meets the table for collaboration to enhance economic cooperation.
What key areas or opportunities do you think are worth focusing on for future maritime cooperation between China and India?
Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world and presently handles 70% of container traffic to facilitate maritime trade. Secondly, the South China Sea has 40% of the world’s petroleum products, carrying 10 billion barrels of petroleum in 2023. Thus, India and China’s primary navigation region and maritime interest constitute the most important region of trade and commerce in the world and become a region of both confrontation and cooperation. Indian Navy’s primary objective of maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region ranges from the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa in the west to the Malacca Strait in the east and further to the Southern Indian Ocean ranges. It frequently engages in deployment routines in the East and South China, from the East to the Western Mediterranean Sea. India excels at its maritime security in this region through Indigenous cooperation.
Meanwhile, being an immediate neighbour, China is developing its Offshore maritime capability by expanding its naval bases. India and China have a high potential to collaborate in joint anti-piracy operations by sharing information on maritime domain awareness and through joint naval exercises to build interoperability. Secondly, regarding disaster management, India is the primary respondent to natural disasters in the IOR through its Humanitarian Assistance and disaster relief (HADR) to support its immediate neighbours, such as Sri Lanka and Maldives, during the 2004 Tsunami.
Notably, during the search and rescue operation for MH370, the missing Malaysian Airlines, in 2014, both nations participated in the multilateral search operations. Thirdly, as a member of SCO and other international organisations, India and China could cooperate in IOR’s anti-piracy operations and counter-terrorism measures. Fourthly, engaging and cooperating in the blue water economy is essential rather than moving towards confrontation and capacity building to counter each other in the region. Significantly, India’s Maritime Vision 2030 focuses on improving the maritime infrastructure and enhancing the country’s logistics and shipping industry. Based on this, the Sagarmala project is stepping towards establishing these objectives to enhance India’s maritime ambitions. Thus, China is reaching the transit node of BRI in the Indian Ocean to further engage with the most populated country in the world to engage its economic transactions. Finally, India and China have the highest potential for joint engagement in oceanographic research in the conjoining interest region. Data sharing on maritime ecology and peaceful engagement in the oceanographic study could further strengthen both nation’s maritime interests and relationships.
Thus, the BRI's economic engagement goals in the IOR and its infrastructure development plans in the region collectively match both nation’s agendas, where confidence-building measures (CBMs) are needed to improve cooperation between the two countries by enhancing transparency in the approach. By developing the port infrastructure in South and Southeast Asia, both nations could improve their trade opportunities to extend their reach to East and West, and vice versa. Thus, the CBMs, through open dialogue, could help to balance the interests of each other by respecting the core interests of each other nations and building mutual trust in maritime engagements.
What are the main challenges faced by China and India in their modern economic and strategic cooperation, and how can these challenges be overcome?
India and China have a high potential to foster economic cooperation through trade agreements and joint ventures to alleviate economic disparities. Both nations are heading towards becoming scientific superpowers through their research from deep sea to deep space. Thus, collaboration is much more needed than confrontation. Primarily, the border dispute prevents both countries from bilateral dialogues and engagements. However, multilateral engagements of both nations in regional forums such as SCO facilitate both nations to share the common interest in building mutual trust through greater economic dialogues and addressing strategic concerns. Being the most populated country in the world, there is a high potential for economic cooperation. Measures are to be taken by both nations to bridge the economic gap through specific initiatives to facilitate trade by streamlining customs procedures and diminishing non-tariff barriers to enhance trade volume. Moreover, focusing on sector-specific agreements with specific targeted agreements for fields such as agriculture, technology, and textiles can boost export cooperation.
Secondly, by identifying each nation's resources and strengths, promoting joint investment ventures can increase cooperation. Recently, renewable energy projects such as solar and wind were seen as a common field of collaboration for promoting sustainable energy production. Enhancing digital connectivity will facilitate small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Further fostering collaboration in sector-specific cooperation will strengthen innovation and market reach to build mutual growth. Thirdly, educational and cultural exchanges could boost cooperation by creating a favourable environment and understanding between the entrepreneurs and researchers who lead the future of regional development. Existing education scholarship programs and work exchange programs and by improving skill development, we could train the evolving researchers towards emerging technology development and collaboration in the determined fields. Finally, building strategic confidence to look beyond realist views on China’s investment in CPEC or China’s BRI’s MSR investments as String of Pearls strategy and, on the other side, India’s participation in QUAD, India’s cooperation with Taiwan, etc., could help promote the cooperation than just highlighting the differences.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle & Geopolitics
What are the key milestones in developing Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, and how have they shaped China's defence strategy and changed China's approach to warfare and conflict management?
Since the 1950s, China has developed drones by experimenting with reconnaissance and surveillance missions. In 1957, Wen Chuan Yuan enriched the industry by proposing a technical project plan for UAV development. After a decade of research and development, the drone industry focused on manufacturing drones for search and rescue missions. Further, drone development in China in the 1980s and 1990s was inspired by the US and the rest. In early 2000, there was a boom in R&D investments in drones, where the primary focus was on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), ground attack, and counter operations. Innovatively, China focused its drone development military policy by bringing in the military-civilian fusion strategy to adopt the capable drone industry to integrate autonomous drones for its modern warfare capability. China has then cultivated its autonomous capability in military training, electronics and ISR.
The Chinese State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) released the National Defense Science and Technology Industry 2025 Plan in 2015 to enhance national defence capabilities through technological innovation and industrial development. The plan emphasises an 'Internet + Manufacturing' model, integrating informatisation and intelligence processes. SASTIND also released Strategic Action Plans to facilitate Civil-Military Integration in high-tech defence equipment. Significantly, China's 'New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan' was introduced in July 2017. It emphasises the importance of advancing AI technology within defence systems as a national priority. It specifically highlights the significance of intelligence in "autonomous unmanned operating systems" as a crucial area for development. The plan encourages the creation of test environments tailored for open, modular, and reconfigurable unmanned systems. In the process, the focus of development was three primary AI innovation platforms: 'group intelligent service platforms,' 'hybrid augmented intelligence support platforms,' and 'autonomous unmanned system support platforms'. It emphasises enabling 'autonomous collaborative control' in unmanned systems within the latter category. This concept involves the capability of a group of unmanned systems, to cooperate and execute collective tasks in dynamic environments without requiring human intervention. Therefore, there are various types of drones in China for military purposes, including reconnaissance, combat, and surveillance. Notable examples include the Cai Hong (CH) series for reconnaissance are capable of long-endurance surveillance missions and the Wing Loong (or WZ) series for combat missions are designed for airstrikes and precision strikes.
The surveillance drones, like the GongJi (or GJ) series, are used for monitoring and intelligence gathering. Technically, China has made strides in drone technology through indigenous development and integration of artificial intelligence. The WZ, developed with AI capabilities, and the CH-4, designed by the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, resemble the MQ-9 Reaper of United States. These drones serve both reconnaissance and combat purposes. Remarkably, Chinese researchers have unveiled military drones capable of splitting into six units midair, expanding their operational capabilities. China is aiming to replace human agents with drones for special forces missions, minimising risks to human lives. The Chinese military is investing in advanced unmanned systems, including drones, as part of a broader military buildup.
China's PLA uses drones for combat, including intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic interference. Modular drones like the WZ series have been used in missions across Taiwan's Air-Defense Identification Zone. Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) involves coordinated operations between manned and unmanned systems to achieve shared mission objectives. China has conducted MUM-T experiments in Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone, the South China Sea, and training scenarios. The Taiwanese Defense Ministry has released illustrations of reconnaissance UAVs supporting fighter aircraft. In November 2022, China introduced the 'Military Trade Army Synthetic Brigade,' which includes artillery reconnaissance and Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) reconnaissance drones for target acquisition and potential aerial or ground-based attacks. The PLA Rocket Force maintains a UAV Regiment and a UAV Battalion in Quanzhou, Fujian province. With the impeding developments, in October 2022, during the Communist Party Congress, President Xi scrutinised the development of UAVs, and thus, the focus on the development has improved AI-powered combat capabilities. Accordingly, investments in research and development focused on the indigenous development to produce advanced drones with enhanced capabilities.
The integration of AI in drones increasingly incorporates artificial intelligence for autonomous operation and advanced mission capabilities. China is rapidly advancing its military capabilities, focusing on AI-powered drones, hypersonic weapons, and naval expansion. The development of drone swarms is a particular focus, with 48 drones successfully tested by China, which improved the defence capability. PLA noted that damage against the drone swarms was around 40%. Moreover, it invests in counter-drone swarms development to boost its defence capabilities. In addition, China is bolstering its navy with new ships and increasing its nuclear warhead count. The PLA Academy of Military Sciences' 2020 analysis emphasises investing in intelligent drones for strategic deterrence and joint battlefield search and rescue. However, a 2023 Military UAV Industry In-Depth Report by Research Capital highlights deficiencies in the Chinese program, highlighting low intelligence levels and reliance on ground remote control systems. Autonomous control technology is needed to enhance combat capabilities and battlefield adaptability.
Despite progress, China also faces challenges in stealth technology and advanced sensors. Drones are crucial in China's military doctrine, supporting integrated warfare and A2/AD strategies, providing reconnaissance and strike capabilities to deter adversaries. They also contribute to power projection, particularly in disputed regions like the South China Sea. China uses drones for reconnaissance and surveillance in disputed areas like the South China Sea. The deployment of drones in the PLA Western Theater Command, the challenges faced by China's military UAV ecosystem, and potential future priorities for China's efforts in this area. In January 2023, the Soaring Dragon (or WZ-7) surveillance drones produced by Guizhou Aircraft Industry Corporation were seen over the East China Sea through the Miyako Strait near Japan. Thus, China integrated its drones into joint military operations, enhancing situational awareness, improving deterrence in the region and increasing its combat effectiveness.
How do advancements in Chinese UAV technology impact the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, and how do they affect China's relationships with neighboring countries and global powers?
Advancements in Chinese UAV technology have significantly impacted the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. During US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in September 2022, Chinese media reported on a PLA Eastern Theater Command exercise around Taiwan in which a WZ-7 drone, an upgraded version of NTU’s BZK-006A, acted as a communications relay between helicopters operating beyond the ADIZ’s median line. The WZ-7’s real-time data transmission capabilities, as evidenced by testing recorded by CCTV in 2021, showcased its ability to enhance operations, including takeoff, target acquisition, and engagement, with precision. The WZ-7 have demonstrated advanced capabilities in real-time data transmission and operational precision, as evidenced during a PLA Eastern Theater Command exercise around Taiwan in September 2022. This exercise, reported by Chinese media, involved the WZ-7 drone acting as a communications relay for helicopters, underscoring the strategic importance of these technologies.
Chinese drones such as the WZ-1, WZ-2, CH-3, and CH-4 have found sizable markets in countries across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Algeria. This proliferation raises concerns about regional stability and the influence of Chinese drones from a US perspective, as it challenges America’s hegemony in military technology and escalates the geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers. In the Indo-Pacific, China's strategic deployment of drones and capabilities from India and the US influence alliance formation and regional power dynamics. Peace and stability in the region increasingly hinge on UAV capabilities, with drones becoming critical strategic assets for modernizing, exporting, and deploying nations. This environment positions the Pacific theatre as a pivotal area where military powers can assert their dominance. If the diplomacy delays, the investments in defense technology and spending by Western nations would began funding to counterbalance geopolitical competition in South China Sea. Thus, China is making its advancements in UAVs to meet the perceived threats from United States in the region and other western powers. By improving ISR, China stands out to defend itself effectively with its technology advancements. Additionally, China Baidu satellite navigation system bolstering its defence capability to defend its national interest in the region. However, United States perceives the economic growth of China would lead to its modernization of defence that might become threat to its immediate neighbours that it allies or cooperates with such as Philippines, South Korea, and India. Thus, when China conducts MUM-T operations across the Taiwan Strait United States is reinforcing its QUAD partnerships to equip them with sufficient UAVs to strengthen the regional security cooperation.
How does China’s UAV development and deployment regulatory framework compare with other major UAV-producing countries like the US and India? What impact do these regulations have on the UAV industry?
China’s UAV development and deployment regulatory framework can be compared with those of the United States and India in terms of their characteristics. China claimed 1.27 million registered drones, demonstrating a substantial market share. The drone industry, in turn, benefits innovation through sales and dominates the military and civilian markets with homegrown products. The potential for export and dual-use technology increases the economic relevance of drone development. China has a thriving domestic drone business, with state-owned enterprises driving military production and companies like DJI controlling the civilian sector. China profits from the desire for low-cost unmanned systems by exporting drones to nations worldwide. Drone technology's commercial and military uses add to their strategic and economic significance. China has enacted laws governing drone use to protect people's safety, security, and privacy. This covers data privacy policies, flight limitations, and licensing. Drone operators must register drones with the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) and get licenses with centralised control, and the licensing and registration are limited for commercial UAVs. The UAV production has significant military influence and funding, and data security is ensured through civil and military fusion. Chinese drone companies such as DJI have revolutionised the industry with advancements and innovations that dominate the global consumer drone market. It is estimated that the revenue of China’s drone market in 2024 has reached US$1.5bn with an estimated annual growth of 4.10%.
When it comes to the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation ensures safety and integration; similarly, it is the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) in India. Additionally, in the United States, the ‘Part107’ regulates the requirements of commercial UAV operations, including pilot certification and provides the operational limits along with the airspace restrictions. In India, “Drone Policy2021” functions for the regulations. Additionally, there is a focus on the local manufacturing campaign for “Make in India” to produce the UAVs. Due to security concerns, India has prohibited using Chinese components in military drones to lessen its reliance on foreign suppliers. Nonetheless, India's defence capabilities continue to be strengthened by strategic drone technology imports, particularly in specialised drone technology. India’s drone market size is estimated to be USD$645million in 2024 and projected to be USD$1437 million in 2029 based on CAGR.
Secondly, the US regulatory environment focuses on innovation through the Integration Pilot Program (IPP) to evaluate emerging technologies and verify their operational concepts. For data security, the United States ensures the piracy concerns for data storage and protection that impact the deployment of UAVs in urban areas such as real estate, construction, agriculture, law enforcement, and security. The civilian drone market in the United States is US$1.48bn, which is similar to that of China, and it is estimated that the drone market could reach US$14.55bn in 2030. With the available data, the military drone market has secured 48.8% of the total drone market share in 2023. Both in the US and India, the drone industry in the emerging market where the innovation and investment from civilian companies were not regulated by the government, providing space for independent technology development, whereas in China, the regulation on the companies could effectively channel the growth and prospects of UAV productions, and it further streamlines the developments through funding and military requirement.
What are the main differences between China, India, and the US regarding UAV technology development?
The United States has attained global leadership in military drone technology, and its notable drones, such as Predator and Reaper, play a significant role in its military operations. Notably, the United States UAV industry is funded by the Department of Defense and through contractors to foster innovation. On the other hand, the Chinese government has developed the civil and military drone industry parallelly through its regular investment in modernising its technology advancement strategy. Its state-owned enterprises have revolutionised the drone industry and dominated the civilian drone market, producing cost-effective and readily exportable drones. Commercially, China is leading the civilian drone market with its robust DJI company. It has invested in swarm technology to increase its potential in both civilian cultural exhibition usage and, on the other side, for military purposes to enrich the attack with multiple drones.
Meanwhile, India is at the importing end and is developing its capability at its own pace. The Defense and Research Development Organization (DRDO) produces India's MALE drone, Rustom, Nishant, Tapas BH-201 MALE drone, AURA, Kiran, Abhyas, Ghatak, Netra, Vikram were adopted for reconnaissance and surveillance. Black Kite, Golden Hawk, and Pushpak were developed by the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), demonstrating its development in drone technology. Beyond its Homegrown drones, India has become a drone importer for military and civilian use to enrich its capability. On October 15, 2024, India clears its US$4bn worth of deal to import MQ-9B SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian High-Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones. It also imports Mark, Heron, Harpy and Searcher from Israel. It further engages India’s private entities, such as the Adani group, to use the Isreal-based Elbit System to produce Hermes (MALE) UAVs. Notably, India also joined a venture with Veda Aeronautical startup in New Delhi to develop long-range Swarm drones named Kamikaze drones for its Air Force. It shows India’s commitment to gaining updated technology for its defence and civilian usage. Thus, India employs multiple strategies for using drone technology in defence. It makes through its R&D. Simultaneously, it procures from leading manufacturers and builds collaborative companies for drone production. Thus, China, the United States, and India stand out in their style of developing their drone technology.
What are the potential impacts of UAV technology advancements on regional security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region?
Due to evolving geo-political turmoil from the shores of the Taiwan Strait to the Himalayas' hill ranges, drone development is expected to become a critical asset role for surveillance and reconnaissance among the involved nations. The advancement in UAV technology serves as a deterrence against potential adversaries or for defending national sovereignty. China recently continues to send its military drones for MUM-T operations across the Taiwan Strait to counterbalance the military superiority in the region. This displays China’s preparedness in defending its national interest. However, it may transform the dynamics of the geopolitics in South China Sea and Himalayan boundaries. Since regional tensions are mounting gradually, nations around the Indo-Pacific region allied with the United States or partnering at QUAD are building their defence capabilities, especially in developing their UAV technology either by indigenous and joint research or by procuring the technology from available nations, such as India. It improved its drone capabilities through its homegrown manufacturing and through procurements. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US uses a variety of drones to improve its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. UAVs that serve maritime security and monitoring operations include the MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and MQ-4C Triton were notably playing a vital role in Indo-pacific defence cooperation of United States. These drones offer wide-area coverage and real-time intelligence and essential to maintaining regional security and improving US situational awareness.
Furthermore, QUAD, which comprises the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, is gradually enhancing its coordination in UAVs to attain interoperability with members. Therefore, lessons from the Ukraine War show that the front line of defence has been redefined recently. The usage of UAVs has wholly shifted the equilibrium of future conflicts. Therefore, UAV advancements in the Indo-Pacific region significantly affect conflict scenarios and power dynamics in the region.
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