China-Latin America Technological Cooperation: Soft Power and Sustainability

As part of its Latin American section, Saint Pierre—a platform dedicated to geopolitical and economic analysis from a global perspective—presents an interview by Joaquin Sáez, researcher of SPCIS. Within this framework, we spoke with Sascha Hannig, International analyst with experience as a financial reporter. Research assistant at the Centre for Global Governance Research at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and co-founder of the Centre for Analysis for Democracy in Chile. She is also an analyst for Sínico Analysis, a Cadal project. Her main fields of study are China's influence in the world and science and technology in society, publishing articles regularly in these areas. She holds a master's degree from Adolfo Ibáñez University and is a PhD candidate in International Law at Hitotsubashi University, as a JICA fellow in the SDG Global Leaders programme.

Joaquín Sáez: How do you assess the processes of technology transfer between China and Latin America? Do they build local capacities or foster dependency?

Sascha Hannig: China has increased its technology transfer efforts in the region in recent years. Initially, these were simple projects, more linked to cooperation with local governments or practical initiatives that indirectly subsidized its own private tech industry. Over time, the strategy shifted toward critical areas such as telecommunications, digital security, and infrastructure. Companies like Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision now compete directly with long-standing European and U.S. providers. These transfers, rather than strengthening local capacities, aim to position China as a competitive tech actor and enhance its soft power by expanding the presence of its companies and technologies in the region. The central logic is not so much horizontal cooperation but the consolidation of China’s technological influence in strategic markets.

Joaquín Sáez: What institutional conditions enable a technology transfer to move from an announcement to a concrete reality?

Sascha Hannig: There are several mechanisms, each with different implications. The first is international public tendering, which takes place when a foreign financier such as the IDB or the World Bank sets specific conditions that restrict which companies can participate. The second is national tendering, governed by local regulations, where in addition to price, technical and social aspects are considered. In the case of 5G, for example, it wasn’t just about who offered the cheapest antennas, but also which ones could operate in extreme climates or in low-density areas. The third mechanism involves local tenders at the municipal or regional level, where the power imbalance is even more evident since the Chinese counterpart is often a large-scale actor facing local governments with fewer resources. The fourth mechanism is negotiations between private actors, which, as long as they comply with local regulations, do not require state mediation. Finally, there is State-to-State negotiation, carried out opaquely and behind closed doors. These last ones have been the most problematic, generating controversies in cases such as Neuquén in Argentina or hydroelectric projects in Ecuador. Each modality shapes the real possibility of knowledge transfer and institutional strengthening.

Joaquín Sáez: Are there examples of technological cooperation with positive impacts on sustainability?

Sascha Hannig: Yes, there are valuable examples. In Chile, the introduction of electric buses into Santiago’s public transportation system, in cooperation with Chinese companies, has had positive effects in reducing urban emissions. Ecologically, this has been progress, since at low cost it has managed to reduce air pollution in one of the most congested cities in the region. Another relevant area has been solar energy: China has become a main supplier of low-cost panels, which has facilitated the transition toward clean energy. However, these achievements coexist with structural limitations. China still depends on coal for more than 70% of its energy matrix, which reflects a contradiction: it exports green solutions while maintaining a fossil-fuel-intensive model at home. Moreover, there is little transparency regarding the full life cycle of solar panels: we don’t clearly know the carbon footprint of their production or what happens to them at the end of their useful life.

 

Joaquín Sáez: Do these projects integrate cultural elements or sustainability worldviews, such as Sumak Kawsay or Kume Mongen?

Sascha Hannig: Generally, no. Chinese projects in the region have not explicitly integrated indigenous worldviews or cultural sustainability approaches such as buen vivir. What predominates is a pragmatic and competitive logic: offering cheaper panels, lower-cost electric vehicles, or more affordable telecommunications technologies. Chinese media outlets like CGTN or Xinhua reinforce this narrative by portraying China as the central protagonist of the energy transition, without emphasizing benefits for local communities or the cultural elements of the region. This gap reveals that technology transfer still does not engage with traditional knowledge or with an integral conception of sustainability.

Joaquín Sáez: Can we then speak of a transmission of the Chinese Ecological Civilization through companies?

Sascha Hannig: The notion of Ecological Civilization has become a component of China’s official discourse and permeates the sustainability reports of its companies. However, this does not necessarily mean there is a genuine interest in transforming production practices or strengthening local sustainability. Companies comply with ESG reports and environmental KPIs because it is part of the global strategy, but in many cases the priority is international positioning and soft power. That said, there are indeed individuals within these companies who believe in the ecological cause and manage to push for changes, but they are not the majority. Even so, imperfect Chinese projects can still be considered preferable compared to a fossil fuel–based model. The key lies in demanding greater transparency, especially regarding hidden negative impacts: mining pollution, deforestation, plastic waste, and graveyards of disused batteries or panels.

Joaquín Sáez: What recommendations would you make for these companies to generate real change in the ecological transition?

Sascha Hannig: I would identify three key recommendations. First, advance transparency: clearly report the carbon footprint of projects, their effective lifespan, and their net benefits. Citizens must know not only the virtues but also the hidden environmental costs. Second, assume integral responsibility: addressing issues such as marine overexploitation, Amazonian deforestation, or plastic waste management. It is not enough to produce cheaper solar panels if there is no recycling plan at the end of their life cycle. Third, strengthen governance in host countries. In Chile’s case, for example, strict tenders should be required to ensure companies meet verifiable standards and contracts remain transparent. A real ecological transition cannot rely solely on corporate goodwill: it requires solid public policies, oversight, and citizen engagement.