Sebastián Schulz: China, Latin America, and the Geopolitics of Development

Sebastián Schulz

As part of its Latin American section, Saint Pierre—a platform dedicated to geopolitical and economic analysis from a global perspective—presents an interview by Joaquín Sáez with Sebastián Schulz holds a Bachelor's degree in Sociology from FaHCE-UNLP and is currently a PhD candidate in Social Sciences. He is a doctoral fellow at CONICET. He participates in the research project "The South Atlantic and its Relations with Other Regions of Global Geopolitical Interest: Case Studies in Light of Current Hegemonic Trends." He is completing a specialization in Chinese Studies at the Institute of International Relations (IRI-UNLP). Schulz is a researcher at the Center for Chinese Studies (IRI-UNLP) and the Center for Research in Politics and Economics (CIEPE). He is a member of the CLACSO Working Groups "China and the Map of Global Power" and "Geopolitics, Regional Integration, and the World System." He co-authored the chapter “Infrastructure Cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean and China: New Scenarios for the Region Amid the Decline of U.S. Hegemony,” with Laura Bogado, published in the book Nuestra América: United States and China – Geopolitical Transition of the World System.

Joaquín: Sebastián, we are seeing growing discussion around the so-called “lithium triangle,” the Chancay megaport, and bi-oceanic corridors. From your perspective, how should we evaluate China’s strategy in Latin America from the lens of non-traditional security?

Sebastián Schulz: China's understanding of security differs from the conventional military-based notion. In the Chinese context, security encompasses the protection of strategic resources essential for a society’s harmonious development—not just territorial defense. Latin America becomes vital under this framework due to its abundance of strategic assets.

The region holds more than 70% of the world’s lithium reserves, a mineral at the core of the current technological transition. Whoever controls these critical materials could lead the next phase of the industrial revolution—and potentially the geopolitical transition. Furthermore, Latin America is one of the world’s top food-producing regions, a crucial factor for China, which has over 1.4 billion people but only about 7–10% arable land. Achieving food security is a declared strategic objective for China.

Since 2018, President Xi Jinping has recognized Latin America as a "natural extension" of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), directing significant investment toward regional infrastructure to foster connectivity and cooperation. China seeks to build mutually beneficial partnerships, but it also faces suspicion from Latin American elites historically aligned with U.S. narratives. This mistrust is rooted in what we might call "pedagogical colonization," where China has long been portrayed as a risky or illegitimate partner.

Joaquín: Would you say that the notion of regional security is being redefined through South-South cooperation?

Schulz: Not entirely. There’s no coherent or unified security doctrine in Latin America. In Argentina, for instance, progressive sectors maintain the belief that the region is a “zone of peace.” While it’s true that we haven’t had interstate wars in recent decades, this view ignores the proliferation of other destabilizing dynamics—like coups, soft power interventions, and judicial or media manipulation, often backed by foreign interests.

Despite the fact that the United Kingdom occupies over 25% of Argentina’s territory in the Malvinas, many local intellectuals and political actors still argue that the country has no real conflict scenarios. This reflects a dangerous normalization of geopolitical subordination. Moreover, the growing presence of China is sometimes seen as a disturbance to the fragile regional equilibrium, reinforcing the lack of a shared security vision.

Joaquín: How do you assess the potential for regional governance regarding strategic resources and infrastructure like the Chancay port or bi-oceanic corridors?

Schulz: We’re at a critical juncture. The current geopolitical transition weakens U.S. global leadership—historically responsible for our region’s peripheral development—and opens space for alternative partnerships. China offers affordable financing for infrastructure projects that could help close Latin America’s development gaps, as identified by CEPAL.

However, our main weakness is the lack of regional integration mechanisms. Initiatives like UNASUR have been dismantled, and CELAC still struggles to fulfill its potential. While China proposes regional-scale projects, responses remain fragmented. The Chancay port, for instance, could become a regional logistics hub, but today it reflects national or even corporate priorities rather than coordinated regional development.

Joaquín: China outlined much of this in its 2020 “China-CELAC Joint Action Plan Towards 2021”—from fiber optics and high-speed rail to electromobility. Yet, few countries followed through beyond Chile. How do you view the role of CELAC as a space for state-led policy continuity?

Schulz: Strengthening CELAC is essential. As a forum without U.S. involvement, it offers relative independence and a chance to collectively shape cooperation with China. But so far, the region has not articulated a clear development strategy nor its own set of priorities to present to China.

We often replicate global narratives—on electromobility or logistics—without asking: for whom and for what purpose? Our main structural challenges are poverty and inequality. Any infrastructure, energy, or technological initiative must contribute directly to overcoming those. Otherwise, we risk deepening extractivist models that benefit only local elites.

Joaquín: Chile currently invests only 0.39% of its GDP in R&D. What is the potential for technology transfer from China to the region?

Schulz: Technology transfer must be a central policy goal. For example, Argentina’s memorandum to join the BRI includes clauses requiring China to promote tech transfer—but in practice, there’s little demand from either the government or private sector to enforce this.

Our export structures are heavily concentrated in raw materials. In Argentina, soybeans, soybean oil, beef, and lithium make up 90% of exports to China. In Chile, it’s copper; in Colombia, oil. Elites are comfortable with this model—they profit from exporting raw commodities and have no incentive to industrialize. Bolivia at least initiated a project to manufacture lithium batteries with Chinese support, but the outcomes remain unclear.

Joaquín: What would it take for Latin America to shift from exporting raw materials to developing industrial capacity?

Schulz: No country has ever achieved autonomous development without advancing mid- to high-level industry. Latin America doesn’t start from scratch—Argentina and Brazil, for instance, once had nuclear technologies more advanced than China’s.

Today, China leads what it calls a new round of industrial revolution, beyond the “fourth” as labeled in the West. Strategic collaboration in areas like robotics, AI, and nanotechnology would be transformative. Latin America also produces vast amounts of data, but these are extracted and processed by U.S. corporations. We need data sovereignty, fiber optics, and domestic satellite development.

However, our energy infrastructure today cannot support a large-scale industrialization effort—it would collapse. China could play a critical role in bridging that gap too.

Joaquín: How does CELAC’s engagement with China differ from its interaction with the European Union?

Schulz: China offers an alternative. Traditional development loans—especially from institutions shaped by Bretton Woods—came with harsh conditions and high interest rates. China asks what countries need and offers flexible financing. Institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the BRICS New Development Bank are more responsive than Western lenders.

Moreover, Western initiatives like Biden’s “Build Back Better World” remain largely symbolic. China, despite its own challenges, has the capacity to deliver concrete funding and execution, something the Global North currently lacks.

Joaquín: Some advocate for “active non-alignment” or strategic autonomy. Given U.S. pressure, how do you see Latin America’s position evolving in relation to China?

Schulz: Let’s be honest: Latin America is already aligned—with the U.S., since the Monroe Doctrine in 1833. The idea of non-alignment is a myth unless we recognize that alignment as a material condition. Worse still, by framing China and the BRICS as similar threats to U.S. dominance, some are justifying continued subordination.

The U.S. itself promotes this rhetoric. Officials like Rex Tillerson and Laura Richardson have warned about “predatory investments” from China, suggesting it represents a new form of dependency. The “non-alignment” narrative becomes a veiled way of reinforcing alignment with Washington.

What we truly need is strategic autonomy—not neutrality, but proactive regional integration aligned with emerging powers like China that offer more democratic alternatives to the current world order.

Joaquín: What about the environmental dimension? Can China’s notion of ecological civilization connect with Latin American ideas like Buen Vivir or Sumak Kawsay?

Schulz: Absolutely. China's vision offers a valuable counterpoint in global climate debates. It rejects the abstract notion of the Anthropocene, which blames humanity as a whole for climate change. This homogenizes responsibility and ignores the role of the capitalist economic model—what many now call the Capitalocene—that drove us to this crisis through overproduction, planned obsolescence, and the commodification of nature.

Pope Francis himself has criticized this “throwaway culture.” Similarly, China advocates for “common but differentiated responsibilities,” asserting that developing countries must prioritize their people’s needs while pursuing sustainable development.

The idea of an ecological civilization aligns with Indigenous principles from Latin America, which place life, balance, and reciprocity at the center. It’s not just about transitioning to clean energy—it’s about redefining development altogether. That shared ground could be fertile territory for a new environmental dialogue between China and the region.